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SEARCH WARRANTS: THE REQUISITES OF VALIDITY
MICHAEL J. McCORMICK*

Ten years have passed since the United States Supreme Court's
holding that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is
inadmissible in state courts.1 It had long been the federal rule that the
fifth amendment protects every person against incrimination by the use
of evidence obtained through search or seizure made in violation of
his rights under the fourth amendment. 2 All searches, whether of a
person, a vehicle, or a dwelling, and whether with or without a warrant,
must now be made in accordance with the fourth amendment and
3
minimum standards which have been set by the Supreme Court.
The validity of any search is determined by the existence of probable cause. It is the primary purpose of this article to outline the requirements of a valid search warrant with particular emphasis upon
the affidavit which shows probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. In an effort to limit the discussion no attempt will be made to
discuss the conditions and limitations on the right to search and seize
without a warrant. Our discussion shall be limited to those cases which
discuss the validity of a search warrant.
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUISITES

The state and federal constitutional provisions which protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures are identical for all
practical purposes. 4 Within these constitutional provisons are requirements that a search warrant, to be valid, must:
1. Describe with particularity the place to be searched;
2. Describe the persons or things to be seized;
3. Be based on the existence of probable cause to search;
*Briefing Attorney Court Criminal Appeals, 1970-1971, B.A. University of Texas, 1967,
J.D., St. Mary's University, 1970.
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
2 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 47, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925).
3 Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed.2d 726 (1963).
4 U.S. CoNs'r. amend. IV as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 9, as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing as near as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
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4. Be based on sworn oath or affirmation that such probable cause
exists.
In Texas, these provisions have been codified in Chapter Eighteen of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.5 Further, Article 1.06 of the Code: has
been enacted verbatim from Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution.6
Of the four constitutional requisites listed above, that of an oath or
affirmation is the sine qua non of the search warrant for without it no
warrant may issue. The sworn oath or affirmation, which is more commonly called the search warrant affidavit, must contain each of the
three other requisites: it must set forth a description of the place to
be searched; a description of the kind of property allegedly concealed;
the name, if known, of the person in charge of such place; and facts
which establish that probable cause exists for the issuance of the search
7
warrant.
To be valid, the warrant must describe with accuracy the place
suspected, the property which is allegedly concealed, and the name or
description of the person accused of having charge of the suspected
place.8 It may therefore be said that the affidavit and the warrant must
contain the same averments except for one aspect: the warrant need not
contain the facts which show the existence of probable cause. As to the
sufficiency of the description of the place to be searched, the objects to
be seized, or the persons in control of the premises, the test is the same
whether the averments appear in the warrant or the affidavit.
SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTIONS

In holding inadmissible in state courts all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution 9 the Supreme
Court thereby made its decisions pertaining to search warrants the
minimum standards for the states. It is by these standards that the
averments in search warrants and affidavits supporting them must be
measured.
Description of Place to be Searched
The constitutions require that search warrants particularly describe the place to be searched. 10 A like requirement pertains to the
5TEx. CODE
6 TEx. CODE
7 Tax. CODE
8 TEx. CODE

CRIM. PROc. ANN.
CRIM. PROc. ANN.
CRIM. PROC. ANN.
CraM. PROC. ANN.

ch.
art.
art.
art.

18 (1965).
1.06 (1965).
18.08 (1965).
18.13 (1965).

9 Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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affidavit." The problem which typically arises in connection with
the description of the place to be searched is whether the description
is sufficient as "particularly describing" such place.
In 1925 Steele v. United States12 adopted the following test which
is still the criterion today:
It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search
warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
3
intended.'

Similarly the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted the rule
that a warrant, though it must particularly describe the place to be
searched, need not be precise or technically accurate in its description;
the sole requirement being that there be sufficient definiteness to enable
the officer to locate the property and distinguish it from other places in
the community.' 4 The description, whether in the warrant or in the
affidavit incorporated in the warrant, must be complete on its face.
The testimony of the officer executing the search cannot cure the omission in the search warrant of the description of the place to be
searched.' 5
(,:
Normally, the search warrant will describe the premises to be
searched by'street, number and city, and an omission of any of these
will make the warrant invalid.' 6 In aiding the property description
given in a search warrant the occupancy and ownership of the premises
as stated in the affidavit may be looked to.' 7 However, proof of occupancy and ownership cannot dispense with the necessity of accurately
describing the premises to be searched.' 8
Description of Persons or Things to be Seized
The second requisite is that a search warrant particularly describe
the persons or things to be seized. 19 General searches are impossible
under this requirement and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. 20 The officer executing the warrant has no
11 TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.08 (1965).
12 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L. Ed. 757 (1925).
IId. at 503, 45 S.Ct. at. 416, 69 L. Ed at 760.
14 Rhodes v. State, 116 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
15 Miller v. State, 114 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
18 Helton v. State, 300 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957); see 51 TEx. JUR. 2d, Searches
and Seizures §§ 19-21 (1970).
17 Gaines v. State, 279 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Grim. App. 1955).
18 Helton v. State, 300 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). For a collection of cases,
see 51 TEx. JUR. 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 19-21 (1970).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948).
20 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927).
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discretion regarding what is to be taken. 21 Stanford v. Texas22 is illus-

trative of this rule. Pursuant to Article 6889-3a, 23 Section 9, a Texas
district judge issued a search warrant authorizing the seizure of "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party
of Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas." The
Supreme Court held that the indiscriminate sweep of the language
was constitutionally intolerable because it amounted to a general
search.24 Stanford, like many cases before it, makes clear that the purpose of requiring such specificity is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.

25

Despite the holding in Stanford it is still the rule in Texas that a
26
general description of the property searched for is all that is required.
It must be remembered, however, that without statutory authority a
27
search warrant to seize particular items is invalid.
In addition to describing the objects to be seized, the warrant must
also name or describe the person or persons who occupy or control
the premises.28 However, if neither the name nor description is known
by the affiant the warrant will still be valid if it reflects that the person
in charge of the premises is unknown. 29
Probable Cause in The Search Warrant Affidavit
In determining the adequacy of a search warrant, the most difficult
problems usually arise in respect to the affidavit. For a warrant to
issue there must be a showing of "probable cause" in the affidavit. At
an early date it was said that "probable cause" meant less evidence
than would justify "condemnation." 3 0 While discussing a "certificate
of probable cause," the Supreme Court, in 1878, created the following
test for probable cause:
If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the of3
fense has been committed, it is sufficient. '
Id.
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed.2d 431 (1965).
23 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6889-3a, § 9 (1960).
24 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed.2d 431 (1965).
25 Id. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed.2d 930
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed.2d 1040 (1967).
26 Trevino v. State, 380 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
27 Greenway v. State, 101 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 1937).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
29Trevino v. State, 380 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
80 Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 3 L. Ed. 364 (1813).
31 Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 642, 645, 24 L. Ed. 1035, 1036 (1878). See also
21
22
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As it relates to search warrant affidavits, this is still the test today.3 2
However, whether or not the proof meets this test must be determined
by the circumstances of each case. 33 The averments upon which this
proof is based must be facts and not mere conclusions, beliefs or suspicions of the affiant.3 4 Further, the final determination of whether

probable cause exists must be made by a neutral and detached magisrate.8 5 Therefore, the affiant must state not only his belief that probable
cause exists, but also the facts upon which his conclusion is based.36
It should also be pointed out that a finding of probable cause, though
it must be based on factual allegations, may rest upon evidence which
37
is not legally competent in a criminal case.
The affiant must state information from which the magistrate may
conclude that probable cause exists. 88 This information may be of

three types:
1. Entirely hearsay (which is commonly the result of a "tip" from
an informer);
2. Entirely facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant; or,
3. A combination of hearsay and facts within the affiant's knowledge.
Few problems arise when a warrant is based on facts within the knowledge of the affiants as long as the affidavit reflects facts and not mere
conclusions. Therefore, the discussion will be addressed primarily to
those instances in which the warrant is based in whole or in part on
hearsay.
THE HEARSAY WARRANTS

In Jones v. United States,8 9 the Court held that hearsay could be
the basis for a warrant as long as there was a "substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." Later, in Aguilar v. Texas,40 the Court elaboDumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 45 S. Ct. 546, 69 L. Ed. 1032 (1925), and Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
32 Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed.2d 327 (1959)
searches without a warrant.
83 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S. Ct. 138, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932).
34 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933).
35 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637 (1969);
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948).
36 This rule adopted in Texas in Dupree v. State, 102 Tex. 455, 119 S.W. 301 (1909).
37 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed.2d 62 (1967); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed.2d 327 (1959).
38 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed.2d 1503 (1958).
39 362 U.S. 257, S0 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed.2d 697 (1960).
40 Aguilar v. Texas" 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.2d 723 (1964).
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rated upon the Jones decision by setting out a test by which search
warrant affidavits based solely on hearsay were to be measured. The
test, which has come to be known as the two "prongs" of Aguilar,
made clear what the Court meant by "a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay":
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and
need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant..
the magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the
' 41
informant . . .was "credible" or his information "reliable.
Thus, to support a search warrant based on information which is
hearsay to the affiant, an affidavit must exhibit the observations made
by the informant from which the informant concluded that the items
to be searched for are where he alleges them to be. Further, the affiant
must express in the affidavit his reasons for believing the informer to
be credible and reliable. Should the affidavit fail to reveal this information, then a warrant based upon it is void and any evidence seized as
42
a result of a search based on such warrant is inadmissible.
THE COMBINATION

WARRANTS

In Spinelli v. United States,43 the Court discussed a search warrant
based upon a combination of facts within, the affiant's knowledge and
hearsay from an informant's tip and then set out a test for the sufficiency of such warrants which embraced the holding of Aguilar. The
Court held that corroborating facts from police observation will make
a hearsay affidavit valid even if it does not meet the requirements of
Aguilar provided the corroborating facts show probable cause to the
extent that:
1. Independent observations by the affiant corroborate sufficient
details of the tip to negate the possibility that the informer fabricated his report, or
2. Independent observations by the affiant contribute to a showing of probable cause by revealing not merely patterns of activity.
,but activity that reasonably arouses suspicion.4
41 id.: at 114. It is also the rule that an affidavit based on double hearsay will be
sufficient if the affiant can show that his informant is reliable. Jaben v. United States,
381 U.S. 214, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 14 L. Ed.2d 345 (1965).
42 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.2d 723 (1964).
43 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637 (1969).
44

Id.
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The Court held:
The informer's report must first be measured against Aguilar's
standards so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is
found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which
corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report
should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision.
He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even When certain
parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as
trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without in-.
dependent corroboration? Aguilar is relevant at this stageof the
inquiry as well because the tests it establishes were -designed to
implement the long-standing principle, that probable: cause must
be determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate," and not
by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, '333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948). A magistrate cannot be said. to 'have properly'discharged
his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip whicheven when partially corrborated-=is nOt as reliable as 'one which
passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone.45
i•
As a result of Spinelli, an affidavit which' fails to meet the requisites
of Aguilar may still be salvaged if it reveals sufficient facts on the
affiant's own observations or knowledge. If the*affidahvif shows adequate
circumstances warranting a conclusion that the informant is reliable
but fails to show circumstances. which would warrant -the informant's
conclusion that the proscribed activity in flict exists 'then these missing
circumstances may be supplied by the affiant from personal observations which reveal suspicious activity that coincides With, the tip given
by the informant. Likewise, if the affidavit states detailed facts which
are the result of the informant's personal :observations but does not
show circumstances which would warrart a conclusion that the informant is reliable, then the results of the affiant's observations, if they
coincide with the details furnished by the informant, will supply the
requisite reliability to make the warrant valid.
TEXAS AFTER AGUILAR AND SPINELLI

Since their rendition, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has had
diverse opportunities to interpret and apply the decisions of Aguilar
and Spinelli. Gaston v. State46 was the first such opportunity.
45 Id. at 415, 89 S. Ct. at 588, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 643.
46 Gaston v. State, 440 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Crim: App. 1969).
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The affidavit which came under scrutiny in Gaston appears, at first
blush, to be based entirely on hearsay.4 7 The majority apparently held
that even though the affidavit did not reflect facts and circumstances
upon which the affiants based their conclusion that the informant was
reliable and credible, it contained sufficient details of first hand knowledge of the informant which, when combined with the affiant's own
conclusions, gave the information reliability.
As pointed out in the concurring opinion in Gaston, if this is the
true interpretation of the majority then the affidavit should be insufficient because it fails to reveal facts which support the affiant's conclusions. But the concurring opinion finds the affidavit sufficient
because it shows that the affiants had "personal knowledge" of the
place to be searched and the party allegedly in control sufficient to
corroborate the informer's tip and show the informer to be reliable.
This conclusion is, likewise, arguably erroneous because the statements
by the affiants are merely "bald and unilluminating assertions," unsupported by a showing of facts from which the asserted "personal
knowledge" was deduced.
It could be argued that Gaston was correct because the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. However, the concurring opinion in Gaston
points out what was probably the correct reason why certiorari was
48
finally denied: United States v. Ventresca.
47 The affidavit in Gaston v. State, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared the undersigned affiants, who being by me severally sworn, upon their oaths state, that: A certain building, house and place, occupied and used as a private residence, located in
Austin, Travis County, Texas described as white frame two story house located at
608 East 191/2 Street, Austin, Travis County, Texas, with the bottom apartment, which
is to be searched, facing and being entered from 19/2 Street, and being the building,
house or place of Sharland Elizabeth Reeves, W-F approximately 20, 5' 6", Brown hair
with bangs, blue eyes and other person or persons unknown to affiants by name,
identity or description, is a place where we each have reason to believe and do believe
that said party so occupying and using as a private residence, the said building, house
and place has in her possession therein narcotic drugs, as that term is defined by law,
and contrary to the provisions of law, and for the purpose of the unlawul sale thereof,
and where such narcotic drugs are unlawfully sold; that on or about the 14th day
of December, A.D., 1967, Affiants have received information from a credible and
reliable informant that .Sharland Elizabeth Reeves is keeping and using marijuana
at her residence which is located at 608 East l9i/ Street, Austin, Travis County, Texas.
The informant has been present on numerous occasions when the subject was using
and under the influence of marijuana and has seen the subject dispense marijuana
to other guests in her residence. In most instances the marijuana is smoked by using
a water type smoking pipe and this instrument is kept in the back or North Bedroom up on a shelf, which is to the right as you enter the bedroom. Also, the
marijuana is kept on this shelf a majority of the time. The informant further states
that there have been several large marijuana parties thrown by Sharland Elizabeth
Reeves within the past few weeks, at which time Sharland Elizabeth Reeves furnished
the marijuana. The informant states that she has seen marijuana in Sharland Elizabeth
Reeves' possession within the past two days.
48 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed.2d 684 (1965).
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Ventresca requires that an affidavit be given a common sense and
realistic reading. In light of this, it may be said that the "personal
knowledge" of affiants in the Gaston case was the result of independent
observation sufficient to validate the affidavit which would be invalid
under Aguilar valid under Spinelli.
SIn Ruiz v. State,49 a divided Court of Criminal Appeals again wrote
concerning a borderline affidavit. The affidavit in Ruiz50 recited many
statements which were prefaced with "I know. . .

."

Nowhere in the

affidavit does it mention where the information was obtained-whether
from an informant, personal observations of the affiant, or a combination-and it would be stretching the holding in Ventresca to
speculate. The opinion in Ruiz correctly applied the holding in Giordinello51 and did not indulge in unwarranted speculation.
CONCLUSION

The Court of Criminal Appeals has had numerous opportunities
to discuss search warrant affidavits based on hearsay and on combinations of hearsay and observations by the affiant,5 2 and has touched
upon practically all conceivable wording of an affidavit. The following
procedure is offered as a rule of thumb method to aid in solving questions involving probable cause in connection with a search warrant
affidavit:
49 Ruiz v. State, 457 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).

50 The affidavit in Ruiz, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

I, Everett H. Hewett, do solemnly swear that heretofore, on or about the 7th day
of December, 1968, in Victoria County, Texas, Alma Ruiz, alias Janie Ruiz did
then and there unlawfully possess a narcotic drug, to-wit: Heroin, and I do have
good reason to believe and do believe that said narcotic drug is now concealed by
the said Alma Ruiz, Alias Janie Ruiz in said County and State in Room 10 of the
Victoria Hotel in Victoria, Texas, which said premises are occupied by and under the
control of the said Alma Ruiz, alias Janie Ruiz.
My belief of the foregoing is based upon the following facts: "I know that on
or about the 24th day of November, 1968, Walter Eugene Benda, Al G. Cantu and
Alma Ruiz came to Six Flags Motel at Victoria in Victoria County, Texas, and occupied
adjoining rooms with a connecting door; that the said Walter Eugene Benda later moved
to another room in said motel; that after the said Walter Eugene Benda vacated said
room, and before it was rented to another occupant, there was found in said room
a syringe, spoon and piece of cotton, which items were of the type usually used by
heroin addicts; that known and suspected heroin addicts frequented the room occupied
by the said Al G. Cantu and Alma Ruiz; and that the said Al G. Cantu and Alma
Ruiz left word that they would be back in Victoria on or about December 6th, 7th,
or 8th."
51 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed.2d 1503 (1958).
52 See Albitez v. State, No. 43,307, Tex. Crim. App., December 9, 1970 (unreported);
O'Quinn v. State, 462 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Garcia v. State, 459 S.W.2d 839
(rex. Crim. App. 1970); Evans v. State, 456 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Mattei
v. State, 455 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); and Crotts v. State, 432 S.W.2d 921
(Tex. Crim. App.'1968).
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1. Determine whether the place, objects and persons are sufficiently
described.
2. Determine whether, from reading the affidavit itself, an informant was involved. If an informant was involved, then apply the
rules announced in Aguilar and Spinelli.
3. If. no informant was involved then determine the sufficiency of
the affidavit in light of Giordinello and Nathanson.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol3/iss1/4

10

